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Abstract—In secure multiparty computation, mutually dis-
trusting users in a network want to collaborate to compute
functions of data which is distributed among the users. The
users should not learn any additional information about the data
of others than what they may infer from their own data and
the functions they are computing. Previous works have mostly
considered the worst case context (i.e., without assuming any
distribution for the data); Lee and Abbe (2014) is a notable
exception. Here, we study the average case (i.e., we work with a
distribution on the data) where correctness and privacy is only
desired asymptotically.
For concreteness and simplicity, we consider a secure version of
the function computation problem of Ko¨rner and Marton (1979)
where two users observe a doubly symmetric binary source with
parameter p and the third user wants to compute the XOR.
We show that the amount of communication and randomness
resources required depends on the level of correctness desired.
When zero-error and perfect privacy are required, the results of
Data et al. (2014) show that it can be achieved if and only if a
total rate of 1 bit is communicated between every pair of users
and private randomness at the rate of 1 is used up. In contrast,
we show here that, if we only want the probability of error to
vanish asymptotically in blocklength, it can be achieved by a
lower rate (binary entropy of p) for all the links and for private
randomness; this also guarantees perfect privacy. We also show
that no smaller rates are possible even if privacy is only required
asymptotically.
I. INTRODUCTION
In secure multiparty computation (MPC), mutually distrust-
ing users in a network want to collaborate to compute func-
tions of data which is distributed among the users. The users
should not learn any additional information about the data of
others than what they may infer from their own data and the
functions they are computing. Various applications such as
online auctions, electronic voting, and privacy preserving data
mining motivate the study of MPC [6, Chapter 1].
In a seminal result, Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson [1]
(also see Chaum, Cre´peau, and Damga˚rd [3]), established that
information theoretically secure computation of any function
is feasible by n users who are connected pairwise by private
noiseless communication links and who have access to private
randomness, even if any set of strictly less than n/2 users
collude. The n/2 threshold is for the honest-but-curious setting
where the users do not deviate from the protocol during its
execution, but a subset of users may collude at the end of
the protocol to try to infer information about data of other
Authors are listed in the alphabetical order.
users that they cannot infer from their own data and outputs
of the function they computed. In making this inference, they
may make use of their own data, their private randomness, and
all the messages they sent and received during the execution
of the protocol. The threshold is n/3 for the malicious case
where the colluding users may also deviate from the protocol
during its execution. It is also known that these thresholds are
tight in the sense that there exist functions which cannot be
securely computed when the number of colluders exceed these
thresholds1.
The amount of communication and randomness required to
securely compute in the model of [1], [3] is an important
open problem. Several works have addressed this to a limited
extent, for the most part, in the worst case context (i.e.,
without assuming any distribution for the data) and for zero-
error computation with perfect privacy [2], [4], [8]–[11], [13],
[14]. Most directly relevant to this paper is [8] where generic
information theoretic lower bounds were obtained for zero-
error computation in a three-user model with perfect privacy
against individual users.
In this paper, in contrast to the above works, we take a
distributed source coding approach to this problem. Specif-
ically, we will assume a probability distribution for the data
(discrete memoryless distributed source), and seek the average-
case performance under asymptotically vanishing error and
vanishing privacy leakage. We would like to point out that [15]
already considered a similar setting, but for a much weaker
notion of security than what we consider below. For con-
creteness and simplicity, we focus on the famous example
of Ko¨rner and Marton [12]. Consider Figure 1. Alice (user
1) and Bob (user 2) observe data Xn and Y n which are n-
length bit strings drawn i.i.d. according to the distribution
pXY (x, y) =
p
21x 6=y +
1−p
2 1x=y, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2.
This is sometimes referred to as the doubly symmetric binary
source (DSBS) with parameter p. Charlie (user 3) wants to
compute the function Zn = Xn⊕Y n, the binary sum (XOR)
of the corresponding elements of the data vectors. Note that
Zn ∼ i.i.d. Bernoulli(p). Ko¨rner and Marton gave a function
computation scheme which requires a rate of R = H2(p) each
from Alice to Charlie and Bob to Charlie such that Charlie
1In cases where the number of colluders exceed these thresholds, additional
noisy resources (e.g., distributed sources or noisy channels) can be exploited
to perform secure computation [7]. In this paper, our focus is on the case
where such additional resources are unavailable.
recovers Zn with vanishing error (as n → ∞), where H2
is the binary entropy function. The scheme involved Alice
and Bob sending syndromes of their observations computed
for the same capacity approaching linear code for binary
symmetric channel with crossover probability p (BSC(p)).
Charlie computes the binary sum of the syndromes to obtain
the syndrome of Zn from which Zn can be recovered with
high probability.
We will additionally require the privacy conditions that
Alice and Bob must not learn more information about each
other’s data than what they can already infer from their own
data, and that Charlie should not learn more information about
Alice and Bob’s data than what he can infer from the binary
sum Zn he wants to compute. Users only have access to
private randomness and pairwise noiseless bidirectional com-
munication links which they may use over multiple rounds.
The users are assumed to be honest-but-curious. By [1], it
is known that any function of the data at Alice and Bob
can be computed at Charlie while guaranteeing these privacy
requirements. We are interested in characterizing the rates of
communication (expected number of bits exchanged over each
link per source symbol) and the rate of private randomness
used. Our main result is a characterization of these rates
for the case where we only require that Charlie reconstruct
Zn with asymptotically vanishing probability of error (as
n→∞) and when the privacy conditions hold in the sense of
asymptotically vanishing information leakage (stated formally
in Section II).
One of the examples in [8] gives the answers for the zero-
error and perfect privacy case. It is easy to see that a simple
protocol achieves a rate of one bit per source symbol over each
of the links and a rate of one bit of private randomness2. [8]
shows that there is no zero-error, perfectly private protocol
which can do with less. In fact, none of these rates can be
lowered even at the expense of higher rates for the others.
For completeness, a short proof of this is presented in the
appendix.
If the zero-error requirement is relaxed to vanishing error,
the coding scheme of Ko¨rner and Marton suggests the follow-
ing secure computation scheme which only requires rates of
H2(p). Recall that Ko¨rner and Marton’s function computation
scheme requires a rate of R = H2(p) from each of Alice
and Bob to Charlie. For secure computation, Alice sends to
Bob an nR-length vector KnR of i.i.d. uniformly distributed
bits drawn from her private randomness. Both Alice and
Bob send their respective syndromes (of length nR) XOR-
ed with KnR to Charlie. Charlie adds these to recover the
syndrome of Zn as before. It is easy to see that this scheme,
in fact, guarantees perfect privacy. We show that this scheme
is optimal in the sense that none of the rates can be reduced
even at the expense of higher rates for the others and even if
only asymptotically vanishing information leakage is desired.
2For example, Charlie sends to Alice an n-length vector Kn of i.i.d.
uniformly distributed bits from his private randomness; Alice sends Kn⊕Xn
to Bob; Bob in turn sends (Kn ⊕Xn)⊕ Y n to Charlie from which he can
recover Xn ⊕ Y n. Perfect privacy is easy to verify.
We prove this converse result for a fairly general class of
interactive protocols.
Related works include works on function computation with-
out the privacy requirement [16]–[18]. As already pointed out
above, another related work is [15]. It studies the randomness
required for secure sum computation under two different set-
tings: (i) in the zero-error, perfect privacy, worst-case setting,
and (ii) average case, asymptotically correct setting under
a much weaker notion of privacy that users are unable to
asymptotically correctly guess the entire data of another user,
but when no private randomness is available to the users.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND STATEMENT OF RESULTS
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Fig. 1. Setup for computing XOR securely
In the setup of Figure 1, Alice (user 1) and Bob (user
2) have blocks of data/input bits Xn and Y n respectively,
where (Xn, Y n) are drawn i.i.d. from a Doubly Symmetric
Binary Source (DSBS)-p distribution pXY (x, y) such that X
and Y are both Bernoulli(1/2), and Pr(X 6= Y ) = p.
Charlie (user 3) wishes to compute an estimate Zˆn of the
bit-wise XOR of Xn and Y n. That is, Zˆn is an estimate
of Zn = Xn ⊕ Y n. Notice that Xn, Zn are independent
and so are Y n, Zn. Each pair of users is connected by a
binary, error-free, bidirectional link private from the other
user. At the beginning of the protocol, all users are allowed
to generate private random variables, i.e., they may generate
random variables which are independent of each other and the
data. We are interested in reliably and securely computing the
XOR, where any single user does not learn anything about the
other users’ inputs/output (if any) at the end of the protocol
than what its own input/output (if any) reveals about them. We
formalise this in Definition 3. We assume that the users are
honest-but-curious, i.e., they follow the protocol honestly but
are interested in obtaining additional illegitimate information
about the inputs/output of other users from all the messages
exchanged.
To accomplish the above task, users need to communi-
cate. Communication proceeds over multiple rounds. In each
round t, every user sends a (potentially empty) message in the
form of a variable length, binary string to every other user.
Let M−→
ij ,t
denote the message from user i to user j, sent in
round t. M−→
ij ,t
may depend only on user i’s input (if any),
private randomness, and all the messages it has seen so far. We
require that M−→
ij ,t
C−→
ij ,t
which itself could be random (determined by the inputs
and the private randomnesses). However, at the beginning of
round-t, both users i and j must each deterministically know
C−→
ij ,t
from the messages they have exchanged with each other
over the ij-link between them in the previous (t− 1) rounds.
The total number of rounds is also allowed to be random, but
from the above description, it is clear that each user will come
to know when the exchanges involving it have finished. We
insist that the protocol terminates in finite number of rounds
with probability 1. On termination, Charlie outputs Zˆn as a
function of his private randomness and all the messages he
received.
Definition 1. In a protocol Πn, where n is the input block
length, users exchange messages with each other over several
rounds as described above at the end of which Charlie
produces an output Zˆn.
We use the following notation throughout this paper. The
transcript on ij-link at time t is
Mij,t := (M−→ij ,t,M−→ji,t).
We also define M tij := (Mij,τ )tτ=1, and Mij := M∞ij denotes
the final transcript on the ij-link. Finally, L−→
ij ,t
is the length,
in bits, of the message M−→
ij ,t
. Clearly, L−→
ij ,t
is a random
variable and L−→
ij ,t
∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Similarly the length random
variables Lij,t, Ltij and Lij are defined as the lengths of Mij,t,
M tij and Mij respectively.
Definition 2. The rate of Πn is defined by the quadruple
(r13,n, r23,n, r12,n, ρn) where:
r13,n :=
1
n
E[L13]
r23,n :=
1
n
E[L23]
r12,n :=
1
n
E[L12]
ρn :=
1
n
H(M13,M23,M12|X
n, Y n)
We note that once the protocol ends at some finite time, all
the subsequent messages are of zero-length.
Definition 3. A rate quadruple (R13, R23, R12, ρ) is achiev-
able in the setup of Figure 1 if there exists a sequence of pro-
tocols (Πn)n∈N, with rates rij,n ≤ Rij for i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j,
and ρn ≤ ρ, such that
P (Zˆn 6= Zn) −→ 0, (1)
I(M13,M12;Y
n|Xn) −→ 0, (2)
I(M23,M12;X
n|Y n) −→ 0, (3)
I(M13,M23;X
n, Y n|Zn) −→ 0. (4)
Notice that we do not need to explicitly include the private
random variables in the privacy conditions since conditioned
on the messages and input (if any) at a user, its private random
variable is independent of the the other input(s). (4) is a
privacy promise to Alice and Bob that Charlie learns only
asymptotically vanishing amount of information about their
data in addition to Zn which he is allowed to compute. Similar
interpretations hold for the other two privacy conditions.
Definition 4. The rate region R for the setup in Figure 1
is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable rate
quadruples.
Our main result is a characterization of the rate region R.
Theorem 1.
R = {(R13, R23, R12) :min(R13, R23, R12, ρ) ≥ H(Z)}.
Remark 1: The achievability is in fact proved for the perfect
privacy case where the privacy conditions (2)-(4) hold with
equality. And, our converse is proved for the weak privacy
setting where (2)-(4) are replaced by (5)-(7) (see Section IV),
i.e., only the rates of information leaked need to vanish
asymptotically.
Remark 2: We note that if Charlie is required to compute Zn
with zero error and perfect privacy (i.e., when (1)-(4) hold
with equality), then on all three links we need n bits to be
exchanged and n bits of private randomness is needed [8].
This result is discussed in the Appendix.
III. PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY
Our achievability scheme directly builds on Ko¨rner and
Marton’s scheme for modulo-two sum of doubly symmetric
binary sources [12]. Since (X,Y ) is a DSBS-p, their XOR
Z = X ⊕ Y is Bernoulli(p). It is well-known that linear
codes achieve the capacity of the binary symmetric channel.
i.e., for fixed ǫ > 0, R = H(p) + ǫ and for each block
length n, there is a linear coding matrix Λn of size (nR)× n
and a decoder Dn such that P (Dn(ΛnZn) 6= Zn) → 0 as
n→∞. In Ko¨rner and Marton’s scheme, Alice sends (ΛnXn)
and Bob sends (ΛnY n) to Charlie, who XORs the received
vectors component-wise to get (ΛnZn). Using the decoder
Dn, Charlie recovers Zn with vanishing probability of error.
In our scheme, Alice first generates m := nR private
random Bernoulli(1/2) bits Km and sends it to Bob. She
also sends A = Km ⊕ (ΛnXn) to Charlie. Bob sends
B = Km ⊕ (ΛnY
n) to Charlie. Charlie XORs the two
binary vectors he received component-wise to get (ΛnZn) and
proceeds to decode as before. This scheme has the rate-tuple
(R,R,R,R) with R = H(p) + ǫ. Since ǫ can be chosen to
be arbitrarily small, it is sufficient to consider this class of
protocols for the achievability of Theorem 1.
It is straightforward to show that our protocol is perfectly
private, i.e., (2), (3), and (4) hold with equality. For (2),
I(A,Km;Y n|Xn) = I(Km;Y n|Xn) + I(A;Y n|Xn,Km) = 0,
since Km is independent of (Xn, Y n), and A is a function of
(Xn,Km). Similarly, (3) holds with equality. Finally, for (4),
I(A,B;Xn, Y n|Zn)
= I(A,B;Xn|Zn)
= I(A,B,Zn;Xn)− I(Zn;Xn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
= I(Km ⊕ (ΛnX
n),Km ⊕ (ΛnY
n), Zn;Xn)
= I(Km ⊕ (ΛnX
n), Zn;Xn)
= 0,
since (Km ⊕ ΛnXn, Zn) is independent of Xn. The penul-
timate step follows from the fact that Km ⊕ (ΛnY n) =
(Km ⊕ (ΛnX
n))⊕ (ΛnZ
n).
IV. PROOF OF CONVERSE
Let (R13, R23, R12, ρ) be an achievable rate quadruple.
Then, by Definition 3, there exists a sequence of protocols
(Πn)n∈N with the corresponding rates rij,n ≤ Rij , i, j =
1, 2, 3, i 6= j, ρn ≤ ρ, satisfying (1) and the weak privacy
conditions
ǫ1 :=
1
n
I(M13,M12;Y
n|Xn) −→ 0, (5)
ǫ2 :=
1
n
I(M23,M12;X
n|Y n) −→ 0, (6)
ǫ3 :=
1
n
I(M13,M23;X
n, Y n|Zn) −→ 0, (7)
as n→∞. By Fano’s inequality, (1) implies, as n→∞,
ǫ4 :=
1
n
H(Zn|Zˆn) −→ 0. (8)
For the lower bound on R12, we proceed as follows.
E[L12] (9)
= E
[
∞∑
t=1
L−→
12,t
+ L−→
21,t
]
=
∞∑
t=1
E
[
L−→
12,t
]
+ E
[
L−→
21,t
]
≥
∞∑
t=1
H(M−→
12,t
|C−→
12,t
) +H(M−→
21,t
|C−→
21,t
) (10)
≥
∞∑
t=1
H(M−→
12,t
|M t−112 ) +H(M−→21,t|M
t−1
12 ) (11)
≥
∞∑
t=1
H(M−→
12,t
,M−→
21,t
|M t−112 )
= H(M12) (12)
≥ H(M12|M13)
≥ I(Xn;M12|M13)
= I(Xn;M12,M13)− I(X
n;M13)
≥ I(Xn;M13|M12)− nǫ3 (13)
= H(Xn|M12)−H(X
n|M12,M13)− nǫ3
= H(Xn|M12)− I(X
n;Y n|M12,M13)
−H(Xn|Y n,M12,M13)− nǫ3
≥ H(Xn|M12)− I(X
n;Y n|M12,M13)− nǫ4 − nǫ3 (14)
= H(Xn)− I(Xn;M12)− I(X
n;Y n|M12,M13)
− nǫ4 − nǫ3
= H(Xn|Y n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= nH(Z)
+I(Xn;Y n)− I(Xn;M12)
− I(Xn;Y n|M12,M13)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤I(Xn,M13;Y n|M12)
−nǫ4 − nǫ3
≥ nH(Z) + I(Xn;Y n)− I(Xn;M12)− I(X
n;Y n|M12)
− I(M13;Y
n|Xn,M12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ nǫ1, by (5)
−nǫ4 − nǫ3
= nH(Z) + I(Xn;Y n)− I(Xn;Y n,M12)
− nǫ1 − nǫ4 − nǫ3
= nH(Z)− I(Xn;M12|Y
n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ nǫ2, by (6)
−nǫ1 − nǫ4 − nǫ3
= nH(Z)− nǫ2 − nǫ1 − nǫ4 − nǫ3.
Here, in (10), C−→
12,t
and C−→
21,t
denote the prefix-free codes
that are used in sending the messages M ~12,t and M ~21,t,
respectively. These codes depend on the particular instance
of the protocol, and are known to Alice and Bob based on
all the messages (M t−112 ) communicated between them till
time t − 1. (10) follows from the fact that expected length
L of any prefix-free binary code for a random variable U
is lower bounded by H(U) [5, Theorem 5.3.1]. (11) holds
because at time t, the prefix-free codes used by any two
users (say 1 and 2) are determined by M t−112 . (13) follows
because, since Xn and Zn are independent, I(Xn;M13) ≤
I(Xn;M13,M23, Z
n) = I(Xn;M13,M23|Z
n) ≤ nǫ3. (14)
follows from H(Xn|Y n,M12,M13) ≤ nǫ4 which can be
seen as follows: From the cut separating Alice from Bob
and Charlie, it follows that, conditioned on (M12,M13, Y n),
Charlie’s output Zˆn is independent of Xn, which implies
the Markov chain Zˆn − (M12,M13, Y n) − Xn. Therefore,
H(Xn|Y n,M12,M13) = H(X
n|Y n,M12,M13, Zˆ
n). Since
Z = X ⊕ Y , we have H(Xn|Y n,M12,M13, Zˆn) =
H(Zn|Y n,M12,M13, Zˆ
n) ≤ H(Zn|Zˆn) = nǫ4.
Now, since ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ3 + ǫ4 → 0 as n→∞, and r12,n =
1
n
E[L12] ≤ R12, we have,
R12 ≥ H(Z).
The lower bound on E[L13] and E[L23] can be proved
along the same lines as for E[L12]. For E[L13], we use the
prefix free codes C−→
13,t
and C−→
31,t
for M ~13,t and M ~31,t at
time t which can be determined from (M t−113 ). Once we
get to the point E[L13] ≥ H(M13) ≥ H(M13|M12), we
apply H(M13|M12) ≥ I(Xn;M13|M12), and from this point
onwards, proceed exactly as from (13). Since E[L13] and
E[L23] are symmetric, appropriate modifications will prove
the same result for E[L23]. Thus, we have
R13 ≥ H(Z)
and R23 ≥ H(Z).
Remark: Ko¨rner and Marton [12] proved a lower bound of
H(Z) on R13 and R23 assuming non-interactive communica-
tion between Alice/Bob and Charlie, that is, Alice and Bob
both send one message to Charlie and based on these two
messages Charlie produces the output. However, this does not
directly apply here since now there is a link between Alice
and Bob, and in addition we allow interactive communication
and private randomness. Note that our bound depends on both
the privacy and correctness conditions since, in the absence of
the privacy conditions, Alice need not communicate directly
with Charlie, for instance.
For the randomness rate ρ, we proceed as follows:
nρn ≥ H(M12|X
n, Y n)
= H(M12|X
n)− I(M12;Y
n|Xn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ nǫ1, by (5)
≥ I(M12;M13|X
n)− nǫ1
= I(M12, X
n;M13)− I(X
n;M13)− nǫ1
≥ I(Xn;M13|M12)− nǫ3 − nǫ1 (15)
≥ nH(Z)− nǫ2 − nǫ1 − nǫ4 − nǫ3 − nǫ1, (16)
where (15) follows for the same reason as (13). To bound
I(Xn;M13|M12) in (15), we proceed similarly as done from
(13).
Since 2ǫ1 + ǫ2 + ǫ3 + ǫ4 → 0 as n→ ∞, and ρn ≤ ρ, we
have
ρ ≥ H(Z).
This completes the proof of the converse.
Remark: Our converse allows for a very general class of
protocols. We not only consider protocols with fixed-length
messages, but those with variable length messages as well.
We imposed a technical condition that the (potentially random)
prefix-free code used for any message transmission on a link
be fully determined by previous messages exchanged over the
same link. Strictly speaking, this is not necessary. It will suffice
for the two communicating users to both agree on the same
code (with probability 1), but in this they may rely on their
data (if any), private randomness, and messages from the third
user as well. We believe that the same result holds even for this
slightly more general setting. The proof here can be readily
extended to derive the same lower bounds in this more general
case for all but R12.
APPENDIX
Here we summarize the arguments of [8] specialized to
perfectly secure computation of XOR (with zero error and
perfect privacy), i.e., (1)-(4) hold with equality. We allow
all input distributions pXY with full support. Alice and Bob
each have a block Xn and Y n of n bits respectively, and
Charlie wants to compute Zn, component-wise XOR of the
input bits. A simple protocol for this is: Alice samples n
i.i.d. uniformly distributed bits (K1,K2, . . . ,Kn) from her
private randomness and sends M13 = Kn ⊕ Xn to Charlie
and M12 = Kn to Bob. Bob computes M12 ⊕ Y n and sends
it to Charlie as M23. Charlie computes M13 ⊕M23, which is
equal to Xn⊕Y n and outputs it. Clearly, this protocol requires
n privately random bits as well as n bits to be communicated
on each of the three links. In Theorem 2, we show that this is
optimal.
Lemma 1. Any perfectly secure protocol for computing XOR
(with zero-error and perfect privacy), for pXY with full
support, satisfies
H(Xn|M12,M13) = H(Y
n|M12,M23) = 0,
I(M12;X
n, Y n) = I(M13;X
n, Y n) = I(M23;X
n, Y n) = 0.
Proof: See [8, Lemmas 2 and 3].
The lemma states that (i) examining the transcripts on the
links which Alice is party to must reveal Xn (similarly for
Bob and Y n), and (ii) examining the transcripts on any one
of the links must reveal nothing about Xn, Y n.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 13 of [8]). Any perfectly secure protocol
for computing XOR (with zero-error and perfect privacy), for
pXY with full support, satisfies,
r12,n, r23,n, r13, ρn ≥ 1.
Proof: We only prove the lower bound on E[L12] and ρ.
The others follow similarly. We can lower bound E[L12] by
H(M12) exactly as we did in the proof of converse (Section
IV) of Theorem 1. So
nr12,n = E[L12] ≥ H(M12)
≥ H(M12|M13)
= H(M12, X
n|M13) (17)
≥ H(Xn|M13)
= H(Xn), (18)
where (17) and (18) follow from Lemma 1.
Now we apply the distribution switching idea from [8]
to complete the argument. Briefly, we note that any secure
protocol for XOR, where input distribution pXY has full
support, continues to be a secure protocol even if we switch the
input distribution to a different one pX˜Y˜ . This follows directly
from zero-error and prefect privacy conditions. Together with
Lemma 1, this implies that the marginal distributions of the
transcripts M12, M23 and M13 (and therefore their expected
lengths) do not change if we switch the input distribution;
see [8, Section 3.2] for more details. This allows us to argue
that
nr12,n ≥ sup
p
X˜Y˜
H(X˜n) = n,
where pX˜Y˜ is any distribution having full support. Now, taking
the uniform distribution gives r12,n ≥ 1. For randomness,
nρn ≥ H(M12,M23,M13|X
n, Y n)
≥ H(M12|X
n, Y n)
= H(M12) (from Lemma 1)
≥ H(M12|M13)
≥ n. (as for nr12,n above)
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The work was supported in part by the Bharti Centre for
Communication, IIT Bombay, a grant from the Information
Technology Research Academy, Media Lab Asia, to IIT
Bombay and TIFR, a grant from the Department of Science
and Technology, Government of India, to IIT Bombay, and a
Ramanujan Fellowship from the Department of Science and
Technology, Government of India, to V. Prabhakaran.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson, “Completeness theorems
for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation,” 20th An-
nual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 1–10, 1988.
[2] C. Blundo, A. Santis, G. Persiano, and U. Vaccaro, “Randomness com-
plexity of private computation,” Computational Complexity, 8(2):145–
168, 1999.
[3] D. Chaum, C. Cre´peau, and I. Damga˚rd, “Multiparty unconditionally se-
cure protocols, 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pp. 11–19, 1988.
[4] B. Chor and E. Kushilevitz, “A communication-privacy tradeoff for
modular addition,” Inf. Process. Lett., 45(4):205–210, 1993.
[5] T.M. Cover and J.A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, 2ed.,
Wiley-Interscience, 2006.
[6] R. Cramer, I. Damga˚rd, J. B. Nielsen, Secure Multiparty Computa-
tion and Secret Sharing - An Information Theoretic Approach, Online.
http://www.daimi.au.dk/∼ivan/MPCbook.pdf
[7] C. Cre´peau and J. Kilian, “Achieving oblivious transfer using weakened
security assumptions,” 29th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science, pp. 42–52, 1988.
[8] D. Data, V.M. Prabhakaran, and M.M. Prabhakaran, “
On the communication complexity of secure computation”,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.7584v2/ , 2014.
[9] U. Feige, J. Kilian, and M. Naor, “A minimal model for secure computa-
tion,” 26th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 554–
563. ACM, 1994.
[10] M.K. Franklin and M. Yung, “Communication complexity of secure
computation,” 24th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pp. 699–710, 1992.
[11] A. Ga´l and A. Rose´n, “Omega(log n) lower bounds on the amount of
randomness in 2-private computation,” SIAM J. Comput., 34(4):946–959,
2005.
[12] J. Ko¨rner and K. Marton, “How to encode the modulo-two sum of binary
sources”, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 219–221, March
1979.
[13] E. Kushilevitz and Y. Mansour, “Randomness in private computations,”
SIAM J. Discrete Math., 10(4):647–661, 1997.
[14] E. Kushilevitz, “Privacy and communication complexity,” 30th Annual
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 416–421, 1989.
[15] E.J. Lee and E. Abbe, “A Shannon approach to secure multi-party
computations,” http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.7360/ , 2014.
[16] N. Ma, and P. Ishwar, “Some results on distributed source coding
for interactive function computation,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 57
(9):6180–6195, 2011.
[17] N. Ma, and P. Ishwar, “Interactive source coding for function computa-
toin in collocated networks,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 59 (7):4289–
4305, 2012.
[18] A. Orlitsky, and J. R. Roche, “Coding for computing,” IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, 47 (3):903-917, 2001.
